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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent of concordance in financial crises
by both asset market and country in six Asian countries over the
period 1970–2002. To that purpose we adapt a concordance index
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financial crises spread across markets over geographic borders rather
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1 Introduction
A direct consequence of the Asian financial crises of 1998 was to focus at-
tention on the root causes of the transmission of financial crises, particu-
larly where that transmission occurred across geographical boundaries and
was not in response to real economic linkages such as trade. One response
was a substantial literature suggesting policy reform in international finan-
cial architecture, with the intent of limiting cross border transmissions; for
example Eichengreen (2002) and Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2003) re-
view proposals, although the most recent discussions have centred on sharing
cross-border information, see BIS (2010: recommendation 7). Others have
dissented from this view, arguing that the underlying cause of transmission
is fundamental economic weaknesses or financial fragility in the recipient
economies; see Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Karolyi (2003) and
Athukorala and Warr (2002) for the case of Asia specifically, and more gen-
erally Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).1 More recently, Joyce and Nabar (2009)
show that for emerging markets a strong banking sector promotes resilience
against the effects of crises. Clearly which of these views dominates will have
a substantial impact on the policy advice offered to countries faced with in-
fection from a crisis elsewhere. Domestic weaknesses can be best remedied
with national policies, but deficiencies in the international financial system
which promote undue transmission of shocks may require an orchestrated
international effort; see Brunnermeier et al (2009).
1These arguments are also clearly made in the first generation literature of financial
crises; see Flood and Marion (1999) for an overview.
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Asia was the star pupil of emerging economies success until the East Asian
crisis of 1997-1998, with relatively high growth, high return on investment
and improving standards of living. This reputation changed abruptly in 1997.
However, it is not clear that all was rosy prior to the crisis. A number of
authors point to relatively strong fundamentals in Asian economies in the
mid-1990s, for example, Furnam and Stiglitz (1998) for Asia in general and
Kenward (1999) for Indonesia, while Athukorala and Warr (2002) conclude
the opposite. In a paper which predates the crisis, Sachs, Tornell and Ve-
lasco (1996) soften their conclusions on the relationships between crises and
fundamentals drawing on Latin American data precisely because of evidence
of weak Asian fundamentals and institutional structure without the presence
of a crisis.
To examine the relative importance of the different possible transmission
mechanisms in the case of Asia we formally construct measures of the con-
cordance between financial crises in the region. By concordance we mean
the contemporaneous occurrence of crises in different markets. The hypoth-
esis we put forward is that if financial crises are primarily associated with
inappropriate domestic fundamentals or institutional structures the results
should show strong concordance between crises in different asset markets in
the same country—that is a preponderance of twin crisis periods. Alterna-
tively, if the international linkages are stronger, perhaps due to some failing
in the international financial architecture, then strong concordance should
occur between crises in the same market across geographical borders.
This paper specifically considers the evidence as to whether contempora-
neous crises in currencies and banking sectors are likely to be independent
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events either within economies or across geographic borders. The first step
in this agenda is to measure the degree of independence between crises, for-
malising the approach of counting numbers of co-occurrences undertaken by
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for example. This leads to the adaption of
the concordance index of Harding and Pagan (2002, 2005) for business cy-
cles to account for the low incidence events, christened the turbulent periods
index. Additionally we extend the concordance indices to the multivariate
case. These indices are used in tests of independent occurrence of multiple
contemporaneous crises.
The concordance indices are applied to monthly bivariate indices of cur-
rency and banking crises for six Asian economies over the period January
1970 to December 2002. The results suggest that when two or more crises
occur concurrently they are unlikely to be coincidental. In the bivariate in-
dices we find that the Asian sample can be characterised as having spread
across markets over geographic borders rather than between markets within
countries. The multivariate indices and tests reinforce this view.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops a bivariate concordance
index appropriate to relatively rarely occurring financial crises. Multivariate
extensions and their properties are outlined. Tests for whether independent
crisis events are truly being observed are explained in Section 3. The concor-
dance index and tests are then applied to Asian data in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
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2 Measuring synchronisation
2.1 Bivariate crises
Let a financial crisis be represented by the binary variable Sit, where i = nm,
which takes the value one if a crisis occurs in country n and market m in
period t and zero otherwise. Synchronisation can be expressed in terms of
means and correlation. Two series are perfectly (positively) synchronised if
they have equal means and the correlation coefficients equals one.
An alternate way of viewing the concordance between series is simply to
‘count’ the number of times the variables Sxt and Syt are in various combina-
tions of states. In a bivariate setting the total observations in the sample (T )
consist of the number of simultaneous crises periods (#(1, 1)), the number
of periods with a single crisis (#(1) ≡ #(1, 0) + #(0, 1)) and the number of
tranquil periods (#(0, 0)), or
T ≡ #(1, 1) + #(1) + #(0, 0). (1)
One possible concordance index is then given by
Iˆt =
#(1, 1) + #(0, 0)
T
= 1− #(1)
T
, (2)
as suggested by Harding and Pagan (2002, 2005) for business cycles. How-
ever, this measures is focussed on samples which are relatively symmetric in
the terminology of Kedem (1980), that is where the mean is around 0.5. In
financial crisis indicator variables this is not the case, due to the low inci-
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dence of financial crises and the preponderance of zeros in the sample. Hence
we adopt the turbulent periods concordance index which focusses attention
on the number of periods of contemporaneous crisis as a proportion of all
periods which experience a crisis. This can be expressed as
Iˆ tp =
#(1, 1)
T −#(0, 0) = 1−
#(1)
T −#(0, 0) , (3)
where we assume that there is at least one crisis in our sample, i.e., T −
#(0) 6= 0. Note that these indices can also be expressed in terms of the
estimated means µˆSx , µˆSy , and the estimated correlation coefficient ρˆS be-
tween Sxt and Syt. See Dungey, Jacobs and Lestano (2010) for graphical
illustrations.
2.2 Multivariate synchronisation
Consider the case of concordance in the context of multiple financial crises
across m financial markets and n countries, giving a total of nm potential
crises indices. To measure the joint occurrence of Z or more crises occuring at
time t consider this as the number of 1s which occur, and denote as (#1 > Z).
So, the multivariate equivalent of the bivariate counting identity (1) becomes
T ≡ (#1 > Z) + (#1 < Z) + #(0), (4)
where #(0) denotes the number of tranquil periods.
The multivariate forms of the indices can be defined analogously to the
bivariate ones. The multivariate turbulent-periods concordance index of in-
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terest in the low incidence binary data gives the simultaneous crises as a
proportion of all crisis periods as
Iˆ tp =
(#1 > Z)
T −#(0) = 1−
(#1 < Z)
T −#(0) . (5)
3 Testing synchronisation
Concordance indices for various crisis series can be calculated as outlined
in the previous section. However, we are also interested as to whether an
observed concordance index exceeds a critical value, indicating that the two
or multiple crises are no longer occurring coincidentally. This section outlines
how those critical values can be calculated.
To obtain critical values for concordance indices, tests of independence
in a contingency table can be applied. For an introduction to testing in-
dependence in contingency tables see Agresti (2002). Table 1 shows the
contingency table of bivariate crises where n is similar to T in identity (1).
Table 1: Contingency table of bivariate crises
Crisis A No crisis A Row sums
Crisis B n11 = #(1, 1) n12 = #(1, 0) n1. = nµSB
No crisis B n21 = #(0, 1) n22 = #(0, 0) n2. = n(1− µSB)
Column sums n.1 = nµSA n.2 = n(1− µSA) n
Below we apply Fisher’s exact test in most cases, which proceeds as
follows. The probability of observing the outcomes in the table when all
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marginal frequencies, i.e., column and row sums, are fixed is equal to
P1 = P{nij|n, n1., nn.1} = P{nij|n, n1.}
P{n.1|n}
=
n1.!n.1!n2.!n.2!
n!n11!n12!n21!n22!
. (6)
Since the row and column sums are fixed, only one of the nij can vary in-
dependently. Without loss of generality, we take this to be n11. We can use
this expression to construct an exact test by calculating the probabilities of
any given configuration of frequencies and summing these over the tail of the
distribution of n11. Alternately the test can be used to calculate the number
of simultaneous crises observations required to obtain a rejection of the null
hypothesis of independence.
Corresponding critical values for the concordance indices and correlation
coefficients can be calculated directly from the critical value of the simulta-
neous crises n11, the incidences of the crises and the number of observations.
For the concordance indices this follows directly from Equations (2) and (3).
The critical value of the correlation coefficient of two binary crisis series can
be calculated by putting simultaneous ones at the beginning of both series,
followed by the additional ones for the first series and zeros for the other, and
the additional ones for the second series and zeros for the first, completed by
zeros for the remainder of the observations.
An equivalent exact independence test for the multivariate case is not
readily apparent. Instead we report simulated critical values for the num-
ber of observations with Z or more joint occurrence of crises, where Z =
2, . . . , Z∗(≡ maxZ). In our illustration below Z∗ equals (6 countries × 3
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types of crises =) 18. In each replication we build a new matrix of observa-
tions on crises dummies with the same properties as the originally observed
data set. The crises means give the exact number of draws from a uniform
(0,1) distribution; these are converted into numbers for the ones in the crisis
dummies. The numbers in this matrix are summed: we calculate the number
of tranquil periods, single crisis periods, periods with two or more simulta-
neous crises, three or more, etc. We use 10,000 replications to generate the
distribution of these totals and 95% critical values. Converting these criti-
cal values for the totals into critical values for the multivariate concordance
indices is again straightforward from Equation (5).
4 Concordance in six Asian countries,
1970–2002
4.1 Measuring and dating financial crises
At least three types of financial crises are distinguished in existing literature:
currency crises, banking crises and foreign debt crises. A number of methods,
including statistical criteria and event studies, have been suggested to classify,
measure and date financial crises. See for example the overview in Jacobs,
Kuper and Lestano (2005).
Currency crises are often dated on the basis of events, such as a devalua-
tion or float of a currency as in a number of studies of the Asian financial crisis
dated from the float of the Thai baht, or by using some form of threshold in
an exchange market pressure index, as originated by Eichengreen, Rose and
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Wyplosz (1995, 1996), or more recently determined endogenously in Abiad
(2003) using Markov switching. These dating schemes are all sample depen-
dent.
In this paper, we identify currency crises in East Asia using the exchange
market pressure approach of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999, 2000). They define the exchange market
pressure index as:
EMPIi,t =
∆ei,t
ei,t
− σe
σr
∆ri,t
ri,t
(7)
where EMPIi,t is the exchange rate market pressure index for country i in
period t, ei,t the units of country i’s currency per US dollars in period t, σe the
standard deviation of the relative change in the exchange rate (∆ei,t/ei,t), ri,t
gross foreign reserves of country i in period t and σr the standard deviation
of the relative change in the reserves (∆ri,t/ri,t).
To avoid the problem that currency crises are associated with high infla-
tion, the sample is split into periods with hyperinflation and low inflation;
separate indices are constructed for each subsample. A period of currency
crisis is identified when the index exceeds some upper bound:
Crisis =
 1 if EMPIi,t > βσEMPI + µEMPI0 otherwise,
where σEMPI equals the sample standard deviation of EMPI and µEMPI is
the sample mean of EMPI. The threshold to define a currency crisis is set to
three standard deviations above the mean.2
2This method is not the only one used in the existing literature for dating crises; other
possibilities include ad hoc dates, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Dungey and Martin (2004),
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Banking crises are even more difficult to define than currency crises. Here
we use the definition and dates provided by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).3
In their chronology banking crises begin with events which point to either
bank runs that lead to closure, merger or take overs by the public sector of
one or more financial institutions or large scale government bailouts. The end
of crises is marked by the cessation of government assistance. In addition to
the Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) data we augment the sample period and
countries covered to include Singapore and South Korea. Our additions to
their dating rely on correspondence with central banks, IMF country reports
and various financial publications as documented in Lestano, Jacobs and
Kuper (2003).
The literature on debt crises is extensive and also incorporates a num-
ber of potential definitions with which to identify an observed debt crisis.
Typically, the incidence of a debt crisis is interpreted as a debt reschedul-
ing agreement or negotiation, arrears (amounts past due and unpaid) on
principal repayments or interest payments and an upper-tranche IMF agree-
ment.4 Here we constructed the debt crisis index based on debt rescheduling
events, where debt default occurs when a country pursues commercial bank
rescheduling with commercial borrowers as defined by the IMF and the World
Bank. Commercial borrowers are defined as those developing countries for
thresholds on volatility, Frankel and Rose (1996), identification with outliers, Favero and
Giavazzi (2002), or tails of distributions, Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003), Pozo and Amuedo-
Dorantes (2003).
3Other literature which dates banking crises includes Caprio and Klingebiel (1996),
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Dermirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
4For example Berg and Sachs (1988), Lee (1991), Balkan (1992), Lanoie and Lemarbre
(1996) and Marchesi (2003) define a debt crisis as debt rescheduling. McFadden et al.
(1985) and Hajivassiliou (1989,1994) incorporate a wider range of the elements listed.
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which at least one third of foreign borrowing is from private sector creditors.
We also include debt problems that led to rescheduling of the official debt in
the Paris Club,5 debt equity swap and voluntary buybacks and use the list of
debt rescheduling events recorded by the World Bank, Global Development
Finance and World Debt Table in various issues.
Table 2: Distribution of financial crises: 1970-2002 numbers (proportion of
total observations)
Currency crises Banking crises Debt crises
Indonesia 9 (2.3%) 12 (3.0%) 5 (1.3%)
Malaysia 10 (2.5%) 7 (1.8%) 0 (0.0%)
Philippines 12 (3.0%) 8 (2.0%) 14 (3.5%)
South Korea 7 (1.8%) 12 (3.0%) 1 (0.3%)
Singapore 11 (2.8%) 2 (0.5%) 0 (0.0%)
Thailand 9 (2.3%) 10 (2.5%) 0 (0.0%)
All countries 58 (2.4%) 51 (2.2%) 20 (0.8%)
Each of these three crisis indicators has in common that they provide zero-
one indices of the form explored in the first section of this paper. Table 2
summarizes the distribution of the financial crises over the countries in our
sample of six Asian countries. Currency crises are distributed more or less
evenly over the six countries. Banking crises are relative rare for Singapore,
5The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors (19 countries) whose role is
to find co-ordinated and sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by
debtor nations. Paris Club creditors agree to rescheduling debts due to them. Reschedul-
ing is a means of providing a country with debt relief through a postponement and,
in the case of concessional rescheduling, a reduction in debt service obligations (see
http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/).
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a country with a more advanced banking system. Debt crises occur most
frequently in Philippines, followed by Indonesia.
4.2 Bivariate concordance outcomes
This section presents a selection of the bivariate concordance outcomes cal-
culated for the data given above, along with tests based on the null of inde-
pendence of the crises, i.e., the crises are coincidental only. We begin with
the latter.
Table 3 reports the results for the tests of independence in the bivariate
examples. The upper triangle of the table contains the observed number
of incidences of each of the potential crisis combinations, for example the
number of times that a banking and currency crisis occurred simultaneously
for Indonesia is 2 in this sample. The lower triangle records the minimum
number of occurrences of joint crises which are not independent based on
the exact Fisher test at the 5 percent significance level. The crisis combina-
tions which reject independence are indicated with an asterisk in the upper
triangle.
Table 4 constructs the bivariate turbulent period concordance indices for
the currency and banking crises case. The upper triangular part of each panel
gives the concordance indicator and the lower triangle the correlation matrix
between the indicators. An asterisk again indicates a significant rejection
(at the 5% level) of the null hypothesis of independence based on the exact
Fisher test outcomes listed in Table 3. There are no cases of simultaneous
debt crises in the East Asian sample so that the turbulent crisis index is zero
13
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in each case. In the case of Malaysia and Singapore the currency crises con-
cordance index is 0.24, indicating the relatively low probability of both these
countries’ currency markets being in crisis at the same time. Unsurprisingly
the concordance index is highest in these tables for pairs of countries involv-
ing Thailand, since Thailand is usually regarded as the source of the shock
for the East Asian crisis of 1997-1998.
Combinations of the crises which reject the null of independence result in
several findings. First, there is some support for the role of the Thai currency
crisis as the ‘trigger’ event for the other currency crises in the region, with
significant associations between the Thai currency crisis and that for each
other country. Second, the Indonesian banking crisis is associated with both
its own currency crisis and a broad range of banking and currency crises in
other countries. Third, the South Korean banking crisis is associated with
banking crises in each of the other countries. Finally the debt crises are
generally less associated with other crises in this sample, the exception being
the Indonesian debt crisis is associated with the Malaysian currency crisis.
Other combinations of bivariate tests are also easily constructed.6 For
example we can construct concordance indices for the possibility of a banking
crisis in one country being associated with a currency crisis in another. The
results of such an exercise produce positive turbulent period concordance
indices for the case of Indonesian banking crises and currency crises in other
countries, but otherwise generally a zero index.
The most interesting of these results is the incidence of so-called twin
6These tables are available from the authors on request, but are omitted in the interest
of saving space.
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Table 4: Turbulent-periods concordance index and correlation of bivariate
crises
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines South Korea Singapore Thailand
Currency crises
Indonesia 0.19∗ 0.05 0.00 0.25∗ 0.20∗
Malaysia 0.30∗ 0.16∗ 0.06 0.24∗ 0.27∗
Philippines 0.07 0.25∗ 0.06 0.05 0.11∗
South Korea −0.02 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.23∗
Singapore 0.39∗ 0.36∗ 0.06 0.09 0.33∗
Thailand 0.32∗ 0.41∗ 0.17∗ 0.37∗ 0.49∗
Banking crises
Indonesia 0.00 0.11∗ 0.20∗ 0.08 0.10∗
Malaysia −0.02 0.07 0.12∗ 0.00 0.06
Philippines 0.18∗ 0.12 0.11∗ 0.00 0.00
South Korea 0.31∗ 0.20∗ 0.18∗ 0.17∗ 0.10∗
Singapore 0.20 −0.01 −0.01 0.40∗ 0.09∗
Thailand 0.16∗ 0.10 −0.02 0.16∗ 0.22∗
Note: Correlations below the diagonal and turbulent-periods concordance indices above
the diagonal. The ∗ denotes a significant rejection of the hypothesis of independence at
the 5% level, see Table 3.
crises, that is concurrent banking and currency crises, which are more fre-
quent in the modern age than previously according to Bordo and Eichengreen
(2000); see also Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In addition, Bordo et al. (2001)
calculate that twin crises are twice as costly as currency crises and four times
more costly than banking crises in terms of output loss.7 Table 5 shows the
concordance indices for twin crises across the different countries. The turbu-
lent periods concordance indices for the countries considered for twin crises
is low for all but Indonesia.
7Bordo et al. (2001) express some surprise at the relatively smaller size of the loss
of banking crises compared with currency crises, but find this result over a number of
sample periods. Their surprise stems from comparisons with alternative literature, such
as canvassed in Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) which rank the costs of banking
crises as above currency crises. Reinhart and Rogoff (2010:p.230) give an average GDP
per capita decline of -9.3% for historical banking crises, but also note the unusual upward
trajectory of GDP growth for emerging economies following earlier crises on p.263.
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Table 5: Twin crisis
turbulent-periods concordance index
Indonesia 0.11
Malaysia 0.00
Philippines 0.00
South Korea 0.00
Singapore 0.00
Thailand 0.00
The results in this section indicate that the financial crises in different
markets and countries are not driven by links within the country—that is
the joint occurrence of any pair of currency, banking or debt crises within a
country does not generally reject the null of independence. One exception
to this is between banking and currency crises in Indonesia, but surprisingly
not in Thailand and Malaysia. This reinforces the finding that the crises
in Asia are primarily driven by international market linkages rather than
individual countries (of course we have not included an equity market crisis
here which may change this picture and would be a useful extension). To
further investigate the linkages between the markets and countries we now
consider the construction and testing of the multivariate concordance indices.
4.3 Multivariate concordance indices
Table 6 reports the multivariate concordance indices for the group of crises
which involves all three types of crisis and all countries. Each row reports
the concordance index for the stated number of common crises occurring
across these categories shown in the first column. For example, the first row
17
reports the concordance index for at least two concurrent crises in either
of banking, debt or currency markets across the six economies sampled. A
total of 22 time periods are identified which fulfill that criteria, giving a
turbulent-periods index of 0.31.
The final column of Table 6 reports the test of the null hypothesis of
independence amongst the crises, where the null hypothesis is that all types
of crisis are independent across all countries in the sample. Beginning with
the higher number of concurrent samples in Table 6, the first panel records
a critical frequency of 3 and 1 for the categories of at least 3 and at least
4 crises, respectively. The appropriate interpretation is that no occurrence
of 5 or 6 concurrent crises can be considered to be mere coincidence. These
cases are related. As the number of concurrent crises recorded is reduced,
the frequency with which this may occur is logically higher. For instance, the
category of at least 3 crises can occur 3 times before the null hypothesis of
independence is rejected. In the total sample, it occurs 11 times, and rejects
the null. For the most encompassing of the concurrent crises, at least 2 crises,
the critical value indicates that up to 21 instances of concurrent crises may
occur completely coincidentally, which is fewer than the 25 observed in the
sample.
To further explore these results, we consider the multivariate concordance
indices and tests of independence across banking and currency crises alone.
We do not consider debt crises as they were of insufficient incidence to gen-
erate interesting results. The currency crisis results are given in the middle
panel of Table 6 and the banking crisis results in the lower panel of that
table. In each case, at all frequencies the null hypothesis of independence
18
is rejected. That is, concurrent banking crises or concurrent currency crises
across countries are not coincidental. This adds further to the evidence col-
lected from the bivariate results, suggesting that the Asian crises spread
primarily through the asset markets across countries, rather than within the
countries themselves.
Table 6: Concordance index and independence tests of multivariate financial
crises in Asian economies
Concordance index Observations Critical value
Across countries–across crises type
At least 2 crises 0.31 25 21
At least 3 crises 0.14 11 3
At least 4 crises 0.07 6 1
At least 5 crises 0.05 4 0
At least 6 crises 0.02 2 0
Crises observations (T −#(0)) 81
Across countries–currency crises type
At least 2 crises 0.30 11 7
At least 3 crises 0.16 6 4
At least 4 crises 0.08 3 2
At least 5 crises 0.03 1 1
Crises observations (T −#(0)) 37
Across countries–banking crises type
At least 2 crises 0.37 13 3
At least 3 crises 0.06 2 2
At least 4 crises 0.03 1 1
Total crises (T −#(0)) 35
Note: The critical value gives the minimum number of observations for the case at hand
that rejects the null hypothesis of multivariate independence at the 5% level.
The occurrences of at least Z,Z = 1, . . . , 6 crises in the top panel may differ from the sum
of the corresponding numbers of currency crises in the middle panel and banking crises in
the bottom panel, since for example a dual currency crises may occur simultaneously with
a bank or a debt crisis.
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The results suggest that when two or more crises occur concurrently, they
are unlikely to be coincidental. In our sample, there were 129 crises, 57%
of them were associated with concurrent crises in other markets or countries
and 43% were isolated to a single market in a particular country. Pairing the
crisis data in Table 3 provided 91 instances of dual crises, between currency,
banking and debt markets across our sample countries, 73 of those pairs re-
jected the null hypothesis of independent occurrence of the events, suggesting
that the majority of the crises were related. The multivariate tests reinforced
this view, rejecting the null of independent crises when more than 2 occurred
simultaneously across all the crisis types, and at a slightly higher frequency
in each of the three crisis categories.8
4.4 Policy Lessons
Policy makers are correct to be concerned about the occurrence of a crisis.
However, knowing which crises are going to spread out is as yet unresolved.
Isolating the characteristics of what makes a particular crisis spread, or al-
ternatively what makes other markets vulnerable to spread from other crises
remains an important issue, and is the focus of work on indicators of financial
fragility such as associated with Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000)
and more recently Rose and Spiegel (2010). Unfortunately this literature has
not been particularly successful to date, with the relatively poor performance
of these indicators documented in Berg and Pattillo (1999a,b) and Edison
(2003). The problem lies with the heterogeneity of the crises; it seems no two
8The differences between the bivariate and multivariate outcomes stress the need for an
encompassing model incorporating different assets and country linkages; see for example
Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries. (2004)
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crises are ever the same. However, it is important we do know that crisis situ-
ations will tend to exacerbate other weaknesses in the economy and financial
system, increasing the possibility of crises in other markets and countries,
which is reflected in the rejection of the independence tests above.
5 Conclusion
In order to examine whether contemporaneous currency and banking crises
in Asia for the period of 1970–2002 can be characterised as coincidental this
paper developed a concordance index for the case of low incidence events and
extended the analysis to incorporate the concept of multivariate concordance.
The application to to East Asian data revealed that concurrent crises were
unlikely to occur independently in this sample, and demonstrated the richer
story which emerges through the use of the new multivariate index.
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that currency (banking)
crises in Asia were primarily transmitted across geographical borders to the
currency (banking) sector in other countries, rather than primarily transmit-
ting within a country and forming twin crises. The dominance of cross border
over cross market condition is consistent with measurements of currency and
equity market contagion in Dungey and Martin (2007). These results suggest
a potential role for international financial architectural reform in mitigating
the transmission of crises, although this is contingent on the extent of po-
tential vulnerability through weak fundamentals. Further work on recent
crises will reveal whether the results of cross border transmissions of crises
generally dominate cross asset market transmissions.
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